Water Law Review
Volume 4

Issue 1

Article 49

9-1-2000

Bd. of County Comm'rs v. Crystal Creek Homeowners' Ass'n, 14
P.3d 325 (Colo. 2000)
Rebekah King

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.du.edu/wlr

Custom Citation
Rebekah King, Court Report, Bd. of County Comm'rs v. Crystal Creek Homeowners' Ass'n, 14 P.3d 325
(Colo. 2000), 4 U. Denv. Water L. Rev. 219 (2000).

This Court Report is brought to you for free and open access by the University of Denver Sturm College of Law at
Digital Commons @ DU. It has been accepted for inclusion in Water Law Review by an authorized editor of Digital
Commons @ DU. For more information, please contact jennifer.cox@du.edu,dig-commons@du.edu.

Issue 1

COURT REPORTS

for purchase only exists with a corresponding contract for sale from
the County, and whether the transferee or transferor actually applied
for the use of the conveyance system was not important.
Second, the court of appeals rejected the City's argument that the
conveyance facility contemplated in the statute included only
aqueducts and canals, and not local distribution systems. The court
stated the legislature would have specifically excluded local
distribution systems from the statute if that was the legislature's intent.
The court ruled the City had no duty to allow the School District to use
the City storage facility for any period longer than the incidental use
time necessary to convey the water.
Third, the court of appeals rejected the City's argument that the
statute should not be enforced because the School District's use did
not promote the statute's conservation purpose. The court stated the
statute did not indicate conservation was the statute's only purpose.
Therefore, the School District's purpose of reducing cost was
acceptable.
Finally, the court of appeals rejected the City's argument that
allowing the School District's use of the water conveyance system
violated section 1810(d) of the Water Code. Section 1810 did not
allow use of the water conveyance facility if the use caused legal injury
to other legal users. The City argued the agreement violated this
provision, because injury would occur to other legal users due to the
increases in the City's water prices if the School District did not
purchase its water from the City. The court rejected this argument
stating an increased water prices was not the type of injury the
legislature intended to prevent.
The court remanded the case with the instruction that the trial
court order the City to produce the information listed in section 1812,
including the amount and availability of the conveyance facility's
unused capacity and the terms and conditions of the facility's use.
Tiffany Turner

COLORADO
Bd.of County Comnm'rs v. Crystal Creek Homeowners' Ass'n, 14 P.3d
325 (Colo. 2000) (holding that the Gunnison River, located in the
Aspinall Unit, did not contain sufficient water for Arapahoe County to
meet the "can and will" requirement of a conditional water right
decree).
The Board of County Commissioners of Arapahoe County
("Arapahoe") applied for a decree for a conditional water right. The
District Court, Water Division No. 4, denied Arapahoe's application,
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first at trial, and again on remand. The court found that the
Gunnison River, located in the Aspinall Unit, did not have enough
water to support Arapahoe's proposed project. The court dictated that
the United States both had an absolute decree for the Aspinall Unit
and had always put the full amount of water to beneficial use. Because
the United States had an absolute decree to this water, the court
concluded that Arapahoe failed to satisfy the "can and will"
requirement of a conditional decree. Arapahoe raised six issues on
appeal.
First, Arapahoe contended that because the Colorado Supreme
Court remanded the case to the water court, the water court should
not have used the "can and will" doctrine. Arapahoe contended that
the remand must have meant the Colorado Supreme Court required
the water court to find more water available than it found in the first
trial. Subsequent to the remand, the Colorado Supreme Court found
that the water court's findings were acceptable since the remand only
set standards for the water court and did not mandate any particular
findings.
Arapahoe's second issue concerned the Colorado River Storage
Project Act ("CRSPA"). Arapahoe divided the issue into three parts.
First, Arapahoe argued that CRSPA did not preclude its requested
appropriation because Congress intended the CRSPA to assist the
Upper Basin in meeting its compact obligations, without regard to the
Aspinall Unit decrees. The court found that Congress clearly intended
the CRSPA to include the water in the Aspinall Unit, thereby making
water unavailable to Arapahoe for appropriation and nullifying a "can
and will" analysis.
Second, Arapahoe claimed that the Aspinall unit's operations
could not stop in-state users from developing water resources. The
Aspinall Unit's operations included hydropower, flood control, and
fish, wildlife, and recreational uses.
Arapahoe contended that
according to the CRSPA, Congress intended hydropower to be an
incidental use subordinate to in-state beneficial uses. The court found
that since the United States had an absolute decree to the Aspinall
Unit, such decree allowed power generation. Moreover, Colorado law
defined hydropower as a legitimate beneficial use. Accordingly,
Arapahoe could not claim any of the water used for hydropower for its
project. Additionally, Arapahoe argued that CRSPA section 620f
stated that the Aspinall Unit could not impair upstream junior
appropriation for domestic or agricultural uses. The court countered
that when read in full, such section clearly applied only to interstate
compact entitlements protecting allocations. The court found that the
water court was correct in considering the Aspinall Unit's
hydroelectric water rights when determining what water was available
for Arapahoe's project. In addition, the court found that both flood
control and fish, wildlife, and recreational resources were legitimate
beneficial uses. Also, the 1968 Colorado River Basin Act authorized
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fish, wildlife, and recreation as a legitimate purpose for the Aspinall
Unit. Because hydropower, flood control, and fish, wildlife, and
recreational uses were clearly beneficial uses, the court deemed the
water court's finding that the water in the Aspinall Unit was
unavailable for appropriation to Arapahoe to meet the "can and will"
requirement as proper.
The third portion of Arapahoe's argument related to the CRSPA
involved a subordination agreement and marketable pool analysis.
Arapahoe first argued that a subordination agreement created an
additional 60,000 acre-feet of water available for appropriation.
Second, Arapahoe contended the Bureau of Reclamation's
("BUREC") admission that an additional 240,000 acre-feet could be
available through reengineering meant that BUREC was not putting
that amount of water to beneficial use. Therefore, such water was
available for appropriation and could be used to meet the "can and
will" requirement. The court found that the subordination agreement
was selective in that only users within the basin could use the 60,000
acre-feet. Consequently, Arapahoe could not use that water to meet its
requirement. Furthermore, although Arapahoe could not claim any of
the 240,000 acre-feet in the marketable pool for appropriation, it
could contract with BUREC to obtain some. However, the court found
that the marketable pool water could not be included in the "can and
will" analysis either.
The third issue Arapahoe raised concerned whether the water
court had correctly determined the amount of water Taylor Park
Reservoir used. The court found that Arapahoe had previously
litigated this issue, and the water court's conclusions were correct.
Accordingly, the doctrines of collateral estoppel and res judicata
prevented Arapahoe from relitigating this claim. Hence, the original
finding stood.
Arapahoe's fourth contention was that it should not have to satisfy
the "can and will" doctrine in order to obtain a conditional right for a
pumping plant still requiring a permit. Since Arapahoe provided little
evidence that it could acquire the permit, the court upheld the water
court's decision that Arapahoe did not meet the requirements of the
"can and will" doctrine.
The court found Arapahoe's fifth claim concerning eminent
domain moot. In addition, the court also found a stipulation
agreement brought up on cross appeal moot. Arapahoe's sixth claim
concerned expert witness testimony.
Rebekah King
Mun. Subdist., N. Colo. Water Conservancy Dist. v. Getty Oil
Exploration Co., 997 P.2d 557 (Colo. 2000) (holding (1) Getty's
application was not void due to expiration of the statute of limitations;
(2) Getty's activities were sufficient to support the water court's finding
of reasonable diligence; and (3) the water court properly applied the

